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Chapter 1: Introduction
In 1926, the state of Kansas seized a car from plaintiff Van Oster due to its alleged
involvement in a bootlegging operation. Despite being acquitted of the crime, Van Oster’s car
was forfeited to the state of Kansas under the state’s new civil asset forfeiture laws (Van Oster v.
Kansas, 1926). These laws allowed the state to seize the property of an innocent owner. Per this
case and many other civil forfeiture trials, law enforcement is allowed to seize property of
innocent owners without being required to prove that the owner of a piece of property is guilty of
a crime.
Asset forfeiture is a legal power that has existed in the United States since the country’s
inception. It permits law enforcement to seize property that has been used in a crime, used to
commit a crime or, is the result of a crime, such as proceeds from a drug offense. Under asset
forfeiture statutes and legislation, law enforcement is often able to retain proceeds from property
seized via asset forfeiture (Worrall J. L., 2001). This has led to concerns about law enforcement
profiting from crime and apprehensions of law enforcement becoming less dependent on tax
payer money (Worrall & Kovandzic, 2008) (Worrall J. L., 2001). If police officers are able to
seize property directly from a crime and profit from that crime, law enforcement profits from
crime. Paradoxically, civil forfeiture provides investments for law enforcement in criminal
behavior.
Furthermore, civil forfeiture does not provide adequate legal protections to indigent
clients. Specifically, it does not provide legal counsel to property owners who cannot afford
their own protections. As a result, civil forfeiture is a powerful tool wielded by law enforcement
against the poor.
Finally, civil forfeiture precedent, as established through nearly two-hundred years of
Supreme Court and district court appellate cases, created an overly complicated justification of
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civil forfeiture. Time and again, the courts have contradicted each other when providing
justifications for civil forfeiture trials. Some courts have deemed civil forfeiture a remedial
power which helps law enforcement fight crime and keep the community safe. Other courts have
declared civil forfeiture punitive, and a way for law enforcement to punish owners who use their
property illegally. The Supreme Court of the United States declared civil forfeiture “quasicriminal” (Boyd v. United States, 1886). Essentially, there is no consensus on whether civil
forfeiture is a remedial punitive legal action. The implications of such discrepancies represent a
large conundrum which has tangible effect on plaintiffs of civil forfeiture trials.
These arguments will be addressed throughout the paper to provide an understanding of
civil forfeiture history and its applications contemporarily. It will become clear how potentially
corrupt this legal power has become and how perplexing it is that it is still employed. Civil
forfeiture is an archaic legal practice which provides too much incentive for corruption and is too
inherently contradictory within its own legal definition to be permitted to continue.
1.1 Types of Asset Forfeiture
There are three variations of asset forfeiture: (1) administrative forfeiture, (2) criminal forfeiture
and (3) civil forfeiture:
Administrative forfeiture is the most commonly employed forfeiture and is classified as a
non-judicial forfeiture. The type of property seized under administrative forfeiture tends to be
property that does not have a recent owner. This can include houses or facilities that been
abandoned, and property that is illegal unto itself. Administrative forfeitures can only be
conducted by federal agencies that have proper authority. An agency must present an
administrative warrant and provide notice of the impending forfeiture to any potential claimants
(Cassella, 2013). If no claim is made within a certain timeframe, the property is forfeited to the
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government. If a claimant places a claim on the property, the administrative forfeiture must then
move to a judicial forfeiture which is either a criminal forfeiture or a civil forfeiture.
Criminal forfeiture permits law enforcement to seize property only after the owner of the
property has been convicted of a crime (Leach & Malcolm, 1994). Should the government wish
to pursue a criminal forfeiture, any property that the government is interested in seizing must be
labeled within the indictment of the offender (Cassella, 2013). After the conviction is rendered,
there is a separate trial to ensure that the property is indeed related to the crime. Following this
phase, the property is forfeited to the government. It is important to note that for the government
to seize property, it must be specifically labeled within the indictment. If the property is not
labeled, the property cannot be seized. Criminal forfeiture was used heavily during the 1970s to
fight organized crime and was relatively ineffective (Levy, 1996). The goal of the government
to employ criminal forfeiture was to cripple organized crime by seizing any illegal proceeds.
However, due to procedural disadvantages, law enforcement was only ever able to seize a
fraction of its intended forfeiture.
Finally, civil forfeiture allows law enforcement to seize property allegedly involved in a
crime without having to charge the owner with a crime (Cassella, 2013). Currently, civil
forfeiture is used primarily to weaken the economic foundations of the illicit drug trade and
reduce drug-related crime (Worrall J. L., 2001). Civil forfeiture can be traced back to an archaic
legal tradition based on a fiction where inanimate objects could commit crime or even be
possessed by Satan (Finklestein, 1973). The personification of property during old English
Common Law created the legal fiction which allowed government to place property on trial
instead of an offender for a crime (Worrall J. L., 2001). Contemporary civil forfeiture no longer
proscribes to this archaic legal fiction, yet the result of this legal fiction has classified civil

CIVIL FORFEITURE: THE FAILURE OF THE COURTS 7
forfeiture as an in rem proceeding. In rem is a Latin term meaning “against a thing” and has
branded civil forfeiture as part of civil law, not criminal law.
1.2 Civil Forfeiture
What makes civil forfeiture unique is the ability to seize property from an owner without
having to prove that the owner was involved in a crime, or even prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that a crime took place (Jenson & Gerber, 1996). In fact, in a civil forfeiture case, the guilt or
innocence of the owner is largely irrelevant (Cassella, 2013) (Worrall J. L., 2001). This stems
from civil forfeiture’s in rem classification.
Additionally, civil forfeiture’s burden of proof makes it unique in the context of the
justice system in the United States. Due to its civil nature, the burden of proof is not placed on
the government, rather the burden of proof is placed on the owner of the property that is
endangered of being forfeited (Bourdreaux & Pritchard, 1996). To seize a property via civil
forfeiture, a law enforcement agency must establish probable cause that a piece of property was
involved in a crime. Once probable cause has been established, the government can seize the
property. At this point, the property is taken to civil court. It is then the owner’s burden to prove
with a preponderance of evidence that the property was not involved in a crime (Cassella, 2013).
The government can pursue a civil forfeiture in various stages of the justice process.
While the government is trying the owner of a crime, the government can also pursue a civil
forfeiture of any property involved in that crime, forcing the owner to defend himself criminally
and prove his property’s innocence’s at the same time. Additionally, the government can pursue
a criminal forfeiture and civil forfeiture of the same property concurrently (Cassella, 2013). The
government may also seize property via civil forfeiture before a criminal trial or after a criminal
conviction and the offender’s release from prison (Cheh, 1994). Concerningly, after an offender
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is released from prison and has paid her debt to society, she may still be in danger of losing
property linked to the original crime.
1.3 Types of Property Subject to Asset Forfeiture
There exist two forms of property that are subject to asset forfeiture laws. First is
personal property. This form of property is anything that can be easily moved and usually
includes smaller objects such as physical money, clothing, and cars. However, it can also
include larger objects such as ships as in the case of an old civil forfeiture trial in the early-1800s
(The Palmyra v. United States, 1827).
The second form of property subject to asset forfeiture is real property. Real property is
anything that cannot be easily moved and is usually tethered to the ground. Examples include
houses, buildings, or land itself (Bourdreaux & Pritchard, 1996). Real property was not
officially subject to civil forfeiture until the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Prevention Act of
1970, which expanded some asset forfeiture powers (Moores, 2009). However, judicial
precedent allowing the civil forfeiture of real property has existed since the Supreme Court case
of Dobbin’s Distillery v. United States, (1877). During this case, an entire distillery was seized
from the owner because the bookkeeper was involved in fraud without the owner’s knowledge
(Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, 1877).
Of the two variations of property forfeitable via asset forfeiture laws, there are three
subcategories. First is contraband, which is any property that is illegal in of itself (Cheh, 1994).
This can include certain weapons and drugs (Cheh, 1994). Contraband is subject to summary
forfeiture. Under this type of forfeiture, the property is seized immediately on the spot without a
judicial hearing (Worrall J. L., 2001). The second form of property, known as proceeds, are any
property that is the result of an illegal action (Cheh, 1994). Examples include profits directly
gained from an illegal transaction, or items purchases with tainted money. A house bought with
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money from a drug sale would count as a proceed subject to forfeiture. If a purchaser of a house
has a partner ignorant of their spouse’s illegal actions, their house can be seized because of its
relation to a crime. Finally, the third form of property is instrumental property. Instrumental
property includes property used to facilitate or commit a crime (Cheh, 1994). If a drug sale took
place in a house, the house would constitute as an instrumentality of the crime. Consequently,
should a drug dealer use a friend’s car to transport illegal drugs, the car would be subject to asset
forfeiture.
As suggested in the previous paragraph, there are times where asset forfeiture can be
complicated by multiple party ownership, especially if an owning party is innocent and
unknowing of the illegal action. In the cases where there are multiple owners of a property that
is forfeited to the government, the courts have adopted a controversial solution. The proposed
solution, known as liquidated damages, liquidates the property seized (Cheh, 1994). From there,
the court divides the money as deemed fit to the government and the remaining owners. This
and other solutions – both proposed and actuated – will be conceptualized and analyzed later in
Chapter 4.
1.4 Civil Forfeiture’s In Rem Meaning
Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding. During this form of proceeding, a piece of
property is placed on trial in the place of a person. As a result, many legal protections and rights
that are taken for granted in criminal trials are not present in a civil forfeiture trial. Most notably,
the in rem nature of civil forfeiture forces the owner to prove the innocents of her property
(Bourdreaux & Pritchard, 1996). The origins of this comes from the Admiralty laws enacted by
Congress in the early 1800s
Subsequently, asset forfeiture permits law enforcement to act independently of the
political process. As the police rely on taxpayers, it is ultimately the government which decides

CIVIL FORFEITURE: THE FAILURE OF THE COURTS 10
how taxes are divided and employed. Although it is the executive branch which is in control of
law enforcement, should law enforcement become dependent on funds from other avenues, their
focus will shift from upholding law and government mandates to ensuring it has the money to
operate. Therefore, law enforcement becomes tethered to crime in such a way where law
enforcement has an interest in ensuring that certain crimes exist in order to profit from, or at the
least meet budgetary expectations.
1.5 Civil Forfeiture Procedure
For a law enforcement agency to seize property, it must first establish probable cause. In
some civil forfeiture cases, the establishment of probable cause can justify a summary forfeiture
of certain property that may have been involved in the crime. In such a case, an owner is
deprived of property without being charged with a crime and the property is held by the
government until a trial takes place. As stated earlier, it is the duty of the owner to prove their
property innocent of the crime. This strange legal practice is due to the relation-back doctrine.
1.5.1 The Relation-Back Doctrine
Per the doctrine, the government is granted rights to any property once it has been
involved in an illegal action (Cassella, 2013). For example, if a car is used to transport illegal
drugs, once the drugs are placed in the car, the government has a right to that car.
Again, the issue of multiple party ownership is raised. In a case where an offender uses a
car to transport illegal drugs, the relation-back doctrine grants the government legal rights over
the car. However, if the offender were to sell the car to someone before it was seized, the
government would still have a claim on the car. If the car was then forfeited to the government,
the new owner of the car is of deprived their property while being innocent of any wrongdoing.
The relation-back doctrine was weakened by the Supreme Court Case United States v.
Parcel of Land, Building, Appurtenances, and Improvements. Known as 92 Buena Vista Avenue,
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Rumson, New Jersey, et al (1992), where the defendant had purchased a parcel of land with
money given to her by a friend (United States v 92 Buena Vista, 1992). The defendant was
ignorant that the money she was using to purchase the land was traceable to a drug transaction.
However, under the relation-back doctrine, the government had a right to the money once it was
involved to purchase or sell drugs. Therefore, the government had a right to anything that was
purchased with the money.
Fortunately for the defendant, the Supreme Court decided that the innocent owner
defense in Buena Vista was a sufficient defense. The Supreme Court ruled that the owner was
unaware of the illegal drug money and therefore could retain the land purchased with the money
(United States v 92 Buena Vista, 1992). The innocent owner defense has always been a highlycontested issue in civil forfeiture law. In the early 1800s the innocent owner defense provided
minimal protections, but since the 1970s there has been a growing support for the defense.
Unfortunately, there is no uniform innocent owner defense to this day. The definition of the
innocent owner defense changes depending on which federal circuit hears the case. The history
and application of this defense will be discussed further in Chapter 4.
1.6 Equitable Sharing
Since the 1970s, the use of asset forfeiture has steadily increased. Currently, forfeiture
proceeds reach hundreds of millions of dollars each year (Worrall J. L., 2001). As stated earlier,
many police agencies can retain proceeds from asset forfeitures. To curb possible police
corruption and entanglement in crime, some states have enacted strict laws to ensure that
forfeiture proceeds go into funds to better the community, such as education and construction.
However, local and state police departments can circumvent these laws by employing a tactic
called equitable sharing (Moores, 2009).
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Through equitable sharing, police agencies can share proceeds from asset forfeiture
cases. When proceeds are gathered in relation to a forfeiture, they are transferred into the
Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) asset forfeiture fund. These resources can then be transferred to
other departments as the DOJ sees fit. To circumvent the laws, state and local agencies must
partake in an adoptive forfeiture. During an adoptive forfeiture, a local agency surrenders an
asset forfeiture case to the federal government. Upon the successful forfeiture of property, 80%
of the proceeds are relinquished to the local or state agency which had original jurisdiction. The
remaining 20% is retained by the federal government and placed in the DOJ’s asset forfeiture
fund (Worrall J. L., 2001). Equitable sharing provides local and state agencies with millions of
dollars in forfeited proceeds each year (Worrall & Kovandzic, 2008). Most concerning about the
possible abuse of asset forfeiture and equitable sharing is the notion that as police agencies
become more dependent on asset forfeiture funds, they are less so dependent – and therefore
responsible – to the public (Worrall & Kovandzic, 2008).
1.7 Introduction to the Punitive/Remedial Arguments of Civil Forfeiture
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of civil forfeiture law is its classification as a civil
action. In multiple Supreme Court cases, such as The Palmyra v. United States (1827), Dobbin’s
Distillery v. United States (1866), Boyd v. United States (1886), Van Oster v. Kansas (1926),
Good v. United States (1993), Austin v. Texas (1993), the Supreme Court of the United States
(SCOTUS) has constantly argued civil forfeiture as remedial and punitive at the same time. This
argument has been central in shaping civil forfeiture legislation and precedent and is the root
cause to many of the inherent flaws within civil forfeiture. Civil forfeiture’s punitive and
remedial nature will be conceptualized in Chapter 3.
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1.8 CAFRA
Civil forfeiture has presented many legal, ethical and constitutional questions.
Reforming and improving civil forfeiture laws presented logistical issues up until the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA) of 2000. Before CAFRA, there was no uniform civil forfeiture
legislation. Civil forfeiture laws derived from many different pieces of legislation that had civil
forfeiture clauses (Cassella, 2013). For example, previous to the National Prohibition Act (NPA)
of 1919, there were no civil forfeiture statutes that allowed for the seizure of property involved in
bootlegging. When the act was passed, there was included such a clause, and it was overturned
when the act was overturned.
CAFRA was the first attempt by Congress to establish a uniform civil forfeiture act. The
act overruled most other federal legislations that included civil forfeiture clauses. It attempted to
solve many of the problems inherent in civil forfeiture as well, such as establishing a universal
innocent owner defense. It also attempted to provide protections to indigent clients who could
not hire a lawyer for their case. Because civil forfeiture takes place in civil court, the Sixth
Amendment’s right to counsel is not protected or guaranteed (Rulli, 2011). CAFRA also
attempted to alleviate the problem of proportionality and civil forfeiture. Often, property seized
in a civil forfeiture trial can be of greater worth than the offense itself.
To litigate a civil forfeiture case with any hope of success, the cost of the case to the
owner often is at least ten thousand dollars (Stillman, 2013). Thus, if a piece of property is
seized and is worth less than said sum, it is often not worth for the owner to litigate the case.
Additionally, civil forfeiture trials can have clear negative consequences for indigent clients who
may not be able to accumulate the money required to litigate the case, no matter the monetary
worth of the property.
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1.9 Chapter Overview
The purpose of this project is to conceptualize and examine many of the flaws and
procedures of civil forfeiture law. The thesis will start with a brief historical analysis of civil
forfeiture laws since the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. This chapter will
present a common understanding of civil forfeiture law to better illustrate how civil forfeiture has
grown since the 1980s War on Drugs.
Following a history of civil forfeiture, Chapter 3 will discuss civil forfeiture’s place in the
legal system. Although civil forfeiture relies on a criminal action, cases are held in civil court.
On multiple occasions, the Supreme Court of the United States has attempted to grapple with this
issue. In the past, the Supreme Court has ruled civil forfeiture to be both punitive and remedial
at the same time. This ruling is problematic because it became difficult to narrow down and
define which amendments of the constitution apply in a civil forfeiture trial. If civil forfeiture is
purely remedial, then many of the amendments do not necessarily apply to civil forfeiture
because it takes place in civil court. If civil forfeiture is wholly punitive, then it does not belong
in civil court and all amendments and constitutional protections must apply to it. However,
because it is “quasi-criminal” it exists in a legal limbo between remedial and punitive, civil and
criminal. Civil forfeiture law has become overly complicated and convoluted because of this.
Chapter 4 will conceptualize contemporary civil forfeiture precedent established by the
Supreme Court of the United States and various federal circuit court rulings. These cases will
illustrate the internal conflicts present in civil forfeiture law. Finally, Chapter 5 will summarize
and conclude the paper and mention final thoughts.
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Chapter 2: History of Civil Forfeiture and its Procedural/Logical Inconsistencies
Since civil forfeiture’s inception, there have been constant flaws and issues that have
arisen within its practice, ethics and constitutionality. This chapter will begin with a brief history
of civil forfeiture since 1970 until 2000 and the enactment of Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act
(CAFRA). This history will help conceptualize many of the complications within civil forfeiture
law.
2.1 Brief Summary of Early Civil Forfeiture History
The original purpose of civil forfeiture was to secure maritime interests during times of
war (Leach & Malcolm, 1994). Civil forfeiture statues derive from the Naval Acts (Bourdreaux
& Pritchard, 1996) in the early 1800s. By employing civil forfeiture, the United States
government could fight piracy more effectively (Finklestein, 1973). During the 1800s, it was
very difficult to track down a pirate in the open water, however, if the government managed to
come across stolen goods, they could enact civil forfeiture and seize the stolen property lawfully.
Additionally, civil forfeiture was used to seize any vessels that were in violation of the United
States’ sovereignty.
In the 1920s, the United States used civil forfeiture to enforce the new laws within the
National Prohibition Act of 1919. This was one of the first times in American history where the
government used civil forfeiture to seize property related to drugs. After the National
Prohibition Act was overturned by the Twenty-First Amendment, all of the civil forfeiture laws
within the National Prohibition Act were also overturned.
2.2 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970
Civil forfeiture saw a large increase in power and usage during the 1970s as it was
purposed to fight the rise of organized crime, specifically crime which revolved around illegal
drugs (Johnson, 2002). During this time, civil forfeiture was largely unreformed. For example,
civil forfeiture did not require the government to notify owners of impending seizures (Johnson,
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2002). Should a house be involved or connected to a drug crime, whether drugs were sold
directly in the home, or potential sellers were using the house as a place to discuss business, the
house could be seized without government notification to the owners of the house. If there were
any innocent third parties who lived in the house, such as a spouse or child, they could be
rendered homeless without notice.
To fight crime in the 1970s, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970. This law allowed for the seizure of any real1 or personal2
property involved in illegal drug transactions or activities (Moores, 2009). This was the first
time that legislators created law where real property was subject to forfeiture. Before this act
was passed, precedent had been established by the Supreme Court of the United States which
allowed for the seizure of real property during the case, United States v. Dobbin’s Distillery
(1877). However, there had never been an act of Congress permitting the seizure of real property
until 1970. Previously real property was seized through administrative forfeitures or criminal
forfeitures due to their extra procedural protections.
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act expanded civil forfeiture in
an additional way. The act allowed for the seizure of any money or items involved or intended
to be used in a drug offense (Jenson & Gerber, 1996). This has led to two problems within civil
forfeiture law. First, seizing something based on intention can be controversial in law because
an intention can never be fully proven true until the action has taken place. Essentially, the
government is seizing money based on a crime that has not transpired. Additionally, civil
forfeiture grants law enforcement the ability to seize property based on probable cause (Johnson,

1

Real Property – any property that cannot be easily moved. Usually real property included buildings, houses, or
something attached to land. Real property can also include land itself.
2
Personal Property – any property that can be easily moved. Usually is reserved for smaller pieces of property but
can include cars and in the case of United States v The Palmyra (1827) included a ship
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2002). Owners can be deprived of property based on a perceived intention, rather than a criminal
act.
Secondly, should a drug dealer use illegally obtained money to purchase another piece of
property, such as a car, the car then becomes subject to civil forfeiture because it is a proceed of
a drug offense. Should an innocent third party be reliant on that property, such as a spouse, the
innocent party could be subject to governmental seizure. This is especially problematic when
tainted money and legitimate money are used to purchase a single piece of property. Even more
so problematic is if the legitimate money was provided by an innocent third party.
Courts have had difficulty differentiating property that is innocent from guilty property in
asset forfeiture cases (Johnson, 2002). To provide an example, should a drug dealer place the
money he has earned in a bank account which he keeps legitimate money in as well, it is nearly
impossible to separate the legally obtained money from the illegal. To seize the entire account
would be to deprive a person of legitimate property that was never used for wrongful purposes.
However, to ignore the money would ensure that a drug dealer profited from crime. Property
gained illegally but conveyed to another owner in a legal fashion leads to unfair applications of
civil forfeiture law.
Despite the flaws inherent in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act, it was passed with practical intentions to deter criminal activity. Namely, the act was
purposed to remove financial incentives of organized crime (Jenson & Gerber, 1996). Per the
act, offenders are meant to be deterred from earning money through criminal means if they
understands that their proceeds will be forfeited to the government. However, this intention is
fundamentally flawed for it relies on offenders understanding what is subject to forfeiture and
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under what circumstances. Unless an offender has a firm understanding of civil forfeiture law,
the deterrent effect is moot.
Coupled with the RICO acts that were also passed around this time, civil forfeiture saw a
large increase in authority and power. As stated under the RICO act, all drug offenses count as a
violation of federal law, therefore any drug offense can trigger a civil forfeiture under federal
statutes (Jenson & Gerber, 1996).
2.3 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
Following the 1970s came the War on Drugs, ushered in by President Reagan. In 1984,
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act was passed (CCCA). This act formulated many new
crimes centered around drug offenses. It is notoriously known for establishing mandatory
minimum sentences regarding drug offenses. However, CCCA also further enhanced civil
forfeiture powers. It enabled the seizure of any real property that had been used or was intended
to be used to violate the statute (Jenson & Gerber, 1996). Although the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act had already established the seizure of real property, the
CCCA was much more comprehensive in its criminal codes and therefore expanded civil
forfeiture to apply to more crimes (Rulli, 2011).
Since the CCCA, assets seized via civil forfeiture have increased annually. In 1985, just
a year following CCCA’s inception, $27.2 million dollars of assets were seized. In 1994, $649.7
million dollars of assets were seized (Jenson & Gerber, 1996). The CCCA also is accredited for
creating equitable sharing (Moores, 2009).
2.4 Law Enforcement and Civil Forfeiture
In 1985, the Department of Justice (DOJ) created the asset forfeiture fund to make it
easier to distribute funds. These funds are primarily distributed through equitable sharing. The
CCCA had streamlined civil forfeiture and made it much easier for law enforcement agencies to
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benefit from seized assets. By 1990, 4,800 local law enforcement agencies were engaged in
equitable sharing (Jenson & Gerber, 1996). By 1989, the DOJ could fund itself without
Congressional oversight via the asset forfeiture fund. At the same time, Attorney, General
Richard Thornburgh stated that $229 million dollars from the asset forfeiture fund would be used
to build more than 3,000 federal prisons across the country (Leach & Malcolm, 1994).
Recently, police departments have become reliant on asset forfeiture proceeds to
compensate for budgetary shortfalls. Specifically, according to Worrall (2001), the larger a
police agency is, the more likely they are to depend on asset forfeiture funds. In Worrall’s
research, of a sample of 383 large police agencies, 45.95% of these agencies either agreed or
strongly agreed that civil forfeiture was a necessary budgetary supplement. Additionally, in a
separate study of 572 different police agencies across the country, 60% were found to be
dependent on asset forfeiture funds to operate (Worrall & Kovandzic, 2008).
Most concerning about the dependency of law enforcement on civil forfeiture funds is the
lessening of reliance on tax-payer money. First supplementing budgetary shortfalls with civil
forfeiture creates a dependency of law enforcement on crime. In essence, if law enforcement
profits from criminal activity, and some agencies view this profit as necessary to exist, law
enforcement then has a pecuniary interest in preserving criminal activity in which it is able to
seize assets. Instead of preventing the distributions of illegal goods, law enforcement is
incentivized to seize money after it was used to buy an illegal substance. Therefore, law
enforcement may pursue the assets of an illegal action instead of attempting to prevent the crime
itself.
Furthermore, law enforcement does not have to prove a person guilty of a crime to seize
the owner’s property. Law enforcement is only required to prove with probable cause that the
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property was involved in a crime. Following CAFRA, law enforcement must, at trial, prove with
a preponderance of evidence that the property was involved in a crime to forfeit the assets, but
this standard of proof is not difficult to obtain if the owner of the property is unable to afford
necessary legal counsel.
In Texas during 2006-2007, a state trooper prioritized traffic stops based on possible civil
forfeiture bounties. Specifically, the trooper would target cars that appeared old, beat up, or
otherwise in bad condition as to indicate an indigent driver. Additionally, the trooper would try
to focus on cars that were out of state and owners who spoke broken or no English to target for
forfeiture (Stillman, 2013). The trooper’s purpose was to seize as much assets for the
department as possible with as little legal recourse. As many of the owners were not in a
position to litigate the forfeitures, the trooper was able to connect the vehicle with a traffic crime
and seize the vehicle and or property inside (Stillman, 2013). Within only six months, the civil
forfeiture program which the state trooper department opened up had amassed $1.3 million
(Stillman, 2013). This represents a clear example of police not only profiting from crime, but of
police purposely targeting poor and potentially innocent owners.
If law enforcement truly is becoming more dependent on civil forfeiture proceeds to fund
itself, then law enforcement could become independent of taxpayers. Law enforcement must
rely on taxes and governmental aid to pay for most of its expenses. This reliance on taxpayer
money forces agencies to adhere to the will of the people. However, if law enforcement can
fund itself through asset forfeiture, the dependency on the public dwindles.
Not only are agencies more likely to become autonomous of the political system, but
some agencies have already begun to focus on asset forfeiture in extreme ways. In Fresno
California, superiors have told their detectives that their performance will be judged based on
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how many assets they seized (Moores, 2009). Officers being judged based on assets seized
represents a direct conflict of interest between the police and criminals. For law enforcement to
seize property, the property must be related to a crime. Civil forfeiture makes officers dependent
on crime to make money. Or at the worst, civil forfeiture places officers in a position where they
are forced to seize property from innocent owners in order to make up for budgetary shortfalls.
Law enforcement agencies are not the only ones who profit from the power to seize
property. Attorneys can also profit from asset forfeiture law. In 2014, Texas police officers
seized $3.5 million dollars in forfeited assets which was used to pay for the salaries of sixteen
employees (Sibilla, 2014). Additionally, in Oklahoma, an ADA used $5,000 from an asset
forfeiture fund to pay off student loans (Wing, 2015). Before Utah passed legislation forcing all
asset forfeiture funds to be placed into an education fund in 2000, a district attorney prioritized
cases based on potential forfeiture earnings (Moores, 2009). It is important to note, following
the legislation, the same DA stopped prioritizing cases based on possible forfeitable assets.
2.5 Civil Forfeiture Inspired Tactics
There are two relatively new terms referring to the dependency law enforcement has
obtained on asset forfeiture. First is a bounty-hunter system. In this system, police focus their
efforts on the most lucrative forfeiture possibilities rather than more serious crimes” (Moores,
2009). Instead of fighting crime, law enforcement becomes a pseudo-bounty-hunting agency
which does not actively fight crime, rather profits from crime. Additionally, in some
departments “leaders encourage officers to pursue targets based on the potential profit they can
provide the department, rather than the threat posed to the community” (Moores, 2009).
Recently, some agencies have adopted the reverse sting operation. Law enforcement will
attempt to sell drugs to a potential buyer, at which point the officer will seize the money that was
to be used to purchase drugs (Moores, 2009). Instead of seizing drugs, the officer seizes money.
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Illicit drugs, from other buyers, remain on the streets. Furthermore, according to Moores, some
officers attempted to sell the drugs at very low prices. If the officers are attempting to sell the
drugs at lower prices, those who are most likely to be caught by these stings are the poor. Again,
the potential harm civil forfeiture has on indigent clients grows.
2.6 Brief Summary of Civil Forfeiture Legal Complications
This section of the paper will divert to discuss the legal complications of civil forfeiture.
The heart of all the issues regarding civil forfeiture, including possible police corruption and
indigent client abuse, stems from these complications.
2.6.1 Standard of Proof
As stated in Chapter 1, in an in rem proceeding, property is placed on trial instead of a
person. Property is not afforded the equal rights as a defendant. Therefore, a presumption of
innocence is not granted to the property, like it would be to a defendant. This concept becomes
confusing when considering whether civil forfeiture is remedial or punitive. If civil forfeiture is
remedial, then to seize property with a presumption of guilt has little repercussions. However, if
civil forfeiture is considered punitive, and the reciprocate of the punishment is the owner of the
property, then civil forfeiture allows the government to punish owners based on a presumption of
guilt. Whether civil forfeiture is considered remedial or punitive, an owner is deprived of
property in civil forfeiture trial.
2.6.2 The Fifth Amendment
A presumption of innocence is not the only legal sacrifice of in rem proceedings. Certain
constitutional protections and rights are not guaranteed as would be in a criminal case. For
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example, the Fifth Amendment’s right of due process3, and protections against double jeopardy4
and self-incrimination5 are not protected in a civil forfeiture case (Leach & Malcolm, 1994). In a
typical civil forfeiture trial, property is seized following a determination of probable cause by a
law enforcement agency with proper authority. Law enforcement can seize the property before a
trial to ensure that it is not destroyed or lost. This preliminary seizure violates due process.
Additionally, the other rights and protections not guaranteed also violate proper due process, as
will be shown.
Civil forfeiture’s procedures have been questioned as to whether they violate the double
jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. During a civil forfeiture case, the government can
pursue a criminal trial against the owner, and pursue a criminal forfeiture of the same property
concurrently (Cassella, 2013). Additionally, should the government fail in pursuing a criminal
forfeiture of a piece of property, the agency can follow up with a civil forfeiture. A defendant of
a criminal trial may be forced to litigate their own innocence while being forced to defend their
property. Should the owner decide not to litigate for their property, the lack of a presumption of
innocence will in essence forfeit the property to the government.
Perhaps most concerning is the varying levels of proof for a criminal conviction and
forfeiture compared to a civil forfeiture. To seize property in a criminal forfeiture, the property
must be seized with the legal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, yet to seize property in a
civil forfeiture trial, the government must only show a preponderance of evidence that the
property is guilty. Should the government fail to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a

3

Fifth Amendment’s Right of Due Process – Affords each person the right to a fair trial following proper
procedures per the trial
4
Fifth Amendment’s Protection Against Double Jeopardy – Prevents the government from charging a person with
the same crime more than once and prevents the government from punishing a person twice for the same crime
5
Fifth Amendment’s Protections Against Self Incrimination – Allows defendants to refrain from providing evidence
which would incriminate themselves
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property was involved in a crime, the government can lower the standard and seize the property
nevertheless.
The exact difference between beyond a reasonable doubt and a preponderance of
evidence is paramount. To prove something beyond a reasonable doubt is to declare that
something did or did not happen as close to absolute certainty as possible. However, a
preponderance of evidence is akin to declaring that something most likely happened but may not
have. It is far easier for the government to suggest that a crime may have happened and that the
property may be connected to that crime than it is for the owner of the property to prove their
property’s innocence (Johnson, 2002).
The Fifth Amendment is also designed to protect defendants from incriminating
themselves. However, this protection is not protected in a civil forfeiture trial (Leach &
Malcolm, 1994). Should a defendant try to defend himself in a civil forfeiture trial, anything
said can be used against him in a concurrent or later criminal trial.
2.6.3 The Sixth Amendment
Consequently, there is no right to legal counsel6 as protected under the Sixth Amendment
in a civil forfeiture trial (Rulli, 2011). The Sixth Amendment applies only to criminal trials and
not to civil trials. The Constitution is designed to restrict government powers to prevent abuses.
In a criminal trial, the government is always the legal actor and therefore all constitutional
amendments apply. However, civil court is designed to be a place where private entities settle
disputes and so constitutional amendments do not necessarily apply. As civil forfeiture takes
place in civil court, the Sixth Amendment falls victim to civil forfeiture’s exceptions

6

Sixth Amendment’s Right to Counsel – Ensures that anyone who should face a crime will be represented by a
public defender should they not be able to afford an attorney
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Gideon v Wainwright (1963)7 ensured that the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel was
provided for indigent clients in cases where the defendant was in danger of losing their physical
liberty. However, the Sixth Amendment is not protected in civil cases because of the
justification delivered in the case Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981). During this
case, a mother had been found guilty of second degree murder and her child was given to the
Department of Social Services (DSS). DSS then attempted to remove the mother’s parental
rights. At trial, the mother, who was indigent, was not provided legal counsel. Following the
trial, the mother lost her parental rights and appealed under the Sixth Amendment.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina heard the case and upheld the decision of the lower
courts, stating that the mother was not guaranteed a right to legal counsel in this specific case.
Justice Stewart presented the opinion of the court stating that “an indigent’s right to
counsel…has been recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty8 if he
loses the litigation” (Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 1981). Justice Stewart
essentially argued that parental rights do not mean the same as physical liberty. This same logic
explains why civil courts, and therefore civil forfeiture cases, do not guarantee a right to counsel.
The potential loss for the plaintiff is not seen as a large enough issue to warrant a right to
counsel. This is especially true when civil forfeiture is regarded as remedial. If civil forfeiture is
remedial, then, as far as the courts are concerned, the owner is not in danger of losing any form
of liberty.
Perhaps more heinous, Justice Stewart also stated “the State…has a…pecuniary interest
in avoiding the expense of appointed counsel and the cost of the lengthened proceedings his

7

(Gideon v Wainwright, 1963)
Physical Liberty – In this case, physical liberty refers to a person’s freedom. The government removes a person’s
physical liberty when it arrests them, sentences them to prison or jail, or does anything which prevents a person
from physically doing what she wishes
8
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presence may cause…and…[the State] has a possible stronger interest in informal procedures”
(Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 1981). Justice Stewart’s justification for denying a
right to counsel stems from the State’s interest in retaining money. The court’s interest in
informal procedures is to prevent an overburdened system. However, the results of these
interests is the violation of people’s liberties – whether physical or property liberties.
The lack of legal representation appears to be out of place when coupled with the
government’s ability to pursue criminal and civil forfeitures at the same time. The defendant
who is litigating for their freedom, must defend their property without legal counsel or guide,
unless they can afford private counsel. However, to afford counsel for a criminal trial and civil
trial at the same time would be costly.
Fighting the government in a civil forfeiture trial can be very expensive for the owner.
Typically, for an owner to litigate a civil forfeiture case with any real chance of winning will cost
around $10,000 (Stillman, 2013). In many cases, the property which in in danger of being seized
is not of the same value as it would be to litigate a proper defense. More concerning, property is
sometimes targeted based on its value to prevent owners from litigating against the seizure. In
Texas, the state trooper mentioned before was purposely targeting people he profiled to be
indigent when seizing property (Stillman, 2013). Property owners who are unable to afford
proper legal counsel often would not bother to attempt to contest the seizure of their property
(Rulli, 2011).
Because it is so expensive to litigate civil forfeiture cases, only 20% of owners will
attempt to defend their property at trial (Moores, 2009). This number can be attributed to a few
possible reasons. Civil forfeiture trials are too expensive for the average person to litigate.
Additionally, the property being seized could be less monetarily than it costs to litigate. Or, the
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clear majority of times law enforcement seizes property, it is indeed in relation to a crime and the
owner is too afraid to litigate for their property at the risk of endangering their liberty. However,
given the information provided so far in this thesis, law enforcement’s motives for seizing
property is highly skeptical.
This statistic becomes more interesting when paired with a complimentary statistic, that
in 80% of civil forfeiture cases, the owner is not charged with a crime (Moores, 2009). These
two statistics seem to be opposites of each other, suggesting that when law enforcement does
charge an owner with a crime, the owner is more likely to attempt to defend their property.
There are a few possible reasons for this. First, the owner may understand that they are charged
with a crime anyway so it is in their interest to attempt to defend their property. Or, perhaps law
enforcement uses civil forfeiture as a tool to evade more formal legal proceedings. If 80% of
owners are not charged with a crime, and only 20% of owners attempt to litigate, officers could
be using civil forfeiture coercively. Attempting to convince owners not to litigate for their
property and in return, no charges will be brought against the owner. Agents could be using civil
forfeiture as a means for its own ends.
2.6.4 The Fourth Amendment
Finally, civil forfeiture also appears to violate the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, it
violates the exclusionary rule9 (Worrall J. L., 2001). In a civil forfeiture trial, law enforcement
can seize a piece of property and establish probable cause afterward (Worrall J. L., 2001). Not
only is law enforcement held to a lower standard of proof in a civil forfeiture trial, law
enforcement can seize property and then determine the meaning of the seizure later.

9

Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule – prevents law enforcement from using evidence gained after
establishing probable cause to establish probable cause
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The exclusionary rule is designed to prevent law enforcement from using illegally
obtained evidence or otherwise non-usable evidence. In a criminal trial, law enforcement is
barred from using evidence post arrest to establish probable cause per the exclusionary rule.
Civil forfeiture directly contradicts this legal practice.
Furthermore, law enforcement can use hearsay and circumstantial evidence to establish
probable cause. Typically, to establish probable cause, the seizing party will present evidence to
a judge who will determine if probable cause has been established (Jenson & Gerber, 1996). The
seizing party also does not need to establish a clear nexus between the property and the crime,
rather the agency need only show a reasonable belief that the property is connected to the crime.
2.7 Forfeiture Procedural Advantages
In addition to not conforming to constitutional constraints in a civil forfeiture trial, the
government also enjoys procedural benefits compared to a criminal trial. First, should a
forfeiture start as an administrative forfeiture, the owner of the property has a short window to
place a claim on the property, If the claimant does nothing before it is too late, the property is
forfeited to the government. Moreover, the only way for the owner to reobtain their property is
through appeal based on procedure. Any other form of appeal of an administrative forfeiture is
often not heard by the courts (Cassella, 2013).
To seize property via civil forfeiture, a law enforcement agency must establish a nexus
between the property and the crime. However, this nexus is not required to be integral to the
crime itself. For example, a house can be seized if it was involved in the negotiating of a drug
offense (Jenson & Gerber, 1996). Until Austin v. Texas, there was no proportionality test
established for civil forfeiture. So long as a piece of property could be linked to a crime, it could
be seized. Precedent established in Austin v. Texas is conceptualized in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3: Civil Forfeiture, Remedial or Punitive?
“Courts of justice will not redress a wrong done by the defendant when he who seeks redress
comes into court with unclean hands”
-

Justice Louise Brandeis (Brandeis Papers Reel 36 Frame 00590)

Civil forfeiture has existed within a legal purgatory since its inception in the early history
of the United States. Though civil forfeiture cases occur in civil court, judicial federal circuits
and the Supreme Court have been at odds as to whether civil forfeiture constitutes a remedial or
punitive litigation. The distinction is paramount. How civil forfeiture is legally classified will
determine which procedures and protections apply during a civil forfeiture case. Should civil
forfeiture be classified as purely remedial, it becomes difficult to attach constitutional and other
legal protections to it. Should civil forfeiture be classified as purely punitive, its powers and
applications will be greatly diminished. Should civil forfeiture remain in the legal limbo where it
is neither purely remedial or punitive, the procedures and protections attached to civil forfeiture
are doomed to remain ambiguous. This chapter will determine civil forfeiture to be punitive and
that any other understanding of civil forfeiture is not only unfair but unconstitutional.
3.1 Civil Forfeiture’s Adversarial System
The intent of civil forfeiture is to seize property only when there is a substantial nexus
between a crime and a piece of property (Jenson & Gerber, 1996). Civil forfeiture’s inherent
tether to criminal activity is integral to its punitive nature. Civil trials were designed to be
between two individuals or private parties. Although the government does get involved in civil
trials, it is not necessary for the government to be a litigator in civil court. However, in all
criminal cases, it is always the government who is the litigator for it is up to the government’s
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discretion as to which crimes are enforced, which crimes are prosecuted and to what extent. This
is best exemplified through the titles of criminal cases. Depending on the jurisdiction of the
case, criminal cases always read The State v Defendant.
Civil forfeiture cases are similar to criminal trials in this way. In a civil forfeiture trial,
the government is always the legal actor. Similar to criminal cases, civil forfeiture cases read
The State v Defendant. The difference is that the defendant in a civil forfeiture trial is an object,
not a person. Moreover, private actors cannot seize property of other private actors through asset
forfeiture laws. Civil forfeiture appears to provide an avenue for which the government can
apply its will over private individuals without having to litigate in a criminal case. Although is
does not prove civil forfeiture is solely punitive, the similarity between civil forfeiture trials and
criminal trials is evident suggesting a punitive nature.
Civil forfeiture would not be the only punitive function civil courts provide. Fines have
been regarded to be punitive and yet are often litigated in civil court. Additionally, fines are
issued in relation for committing a crime. However, fines tend to be substantive of criminal
convictions and officers typically usher fines in relation to municipal violations. Civil forfeiture
on the other hand is entwined mainly with felonies, such as drug law violations or white collar
crimes.
Furthermore, civil forfeiture is viewed as a preventative tool law enforcement can employ
to incapacitate future crime (Leach & Malcolm, 1994). As stated earlier, law enforcement
employed criminal forfeiture in the 1970s to fight organized crime (Levy, 1996). The purpose of
criminal forfeiture was to limit the capabilities of organized crime, not necessarily to deter
organized crime. In his book A Liscense to Steel, Levy mentions that in 1970, organized crime
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had so much money that if a person were to build the Empire State building using nothing but
hundred-dollar-bills lying flat, some organized crime institutions would still have more money.
3.2 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Co. (1974)
In 1974, the Supreme Court of the United States seemed to uphold the punitive nature of
civil forfeiture law in the case, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Company (1974). In this case,
the owner of a yacht had leased the yacht to residents of Puerto Rico. The yacht was seized
because the yacht housed marijuana. The owner of the yacht was unaware of the illegal usage of
his yacht. Calero-Toledo appealed the forfeiture of his yacht because he had not been given a
proper pre-trial seizure notice which violated his right to due process.
The Supreme Court denied his appeal on several grounds. First, the Supreme Court
stated that the right to a pre-trial seizure notice is not guaranteed if the property can be easily
moved, destroyed or concealed by the time of the trial (Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Company, 1974). Additionally, the Court stated forfeitures are not rendered unconstitutional if
the owner of the property involved is innocent. This is attributed to the in-rem nature of civil
forfeiture. The rights and innocents of the owner are not taken into consideration because it is
the property which is on trial, not the owner.
Most importantly, the Court stated that Puerto Rican asset forfeiture statutes were
designed to further the punitive and deterrent purposes of Puerto Rican law (Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Company, 1974). Civil forfeiture in this case was purposed to
compliment the punitive nature of a specific law. The primary focus of the forfeiture, at least
according to the Court, was not to remedy the drug violation which the yacht was involved in.
Instead, the focus was to punish the violators of the law.
It is important to note who is being punished in this case. The lessees of the yacht are not
the subject of the punitive action. Neither is the yacht company a direct recipient of the legal
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action. Instead, it is the owner of the yacht who loses his property. This case represents an
example of how civil forfeiture can deprive innocent owners of their property. The owner of the
yacht did nothing illegal yet was the one who bore the brunt of the illegal action.
3.3 Congressional View of Civil Forfeiture
Civil forfeiture, and asset forfeiture in general, can be used as a supplemental tool to
imprisonment. In 1992, a congressional panel stated that few people in Congress or law
enforcement believe that imprisonment is enough of a punishment for participating in the drug
trade and that civil forfeiture was a necessary procedure to punish and deter drug crimes (Jenson
& Gerber, 1996). Importantly, Congress used of the word “punishment”. The purpose of civil
forfeiture is to punish owners who use their property illegally. It is to deprive any potential
criminals of the items they used to commit a crime or gained because of a crime.
Additionally, Congress mentioned civil forfeiture is meant to have a deterrence affect.
Deterrence is a concept that is routinely connected with the criminal justice system. Preventative
policing often relies on deterrence in some form to prevent a crime from happening. Typically,
deterrence is in reference to the Rational Choice Theory10. If a criminal understands he may lose
all his property should he use it to commit a crime, or if a criminal understands he will lose any
proceeds of a crime, the would-be criminal is less likely to commit the crime in the first place.
Civil forfeiture is punitive in this sense because it is relying on negative reinforcement to prevent
a potential criminal from committing a crime. Civil forfeiture as a deterrence is reliant on a
criminal action. Upon such action, civil forfeiture introduces a negative action, which is the
seizure of property. This action is to be so negative that it is to make an example of the criminal

10

Rational Choice Theory – A criminal justice theory that explains all people are rational creatures and people only
commit crimes when it benefits them. This theory is often compared to a hedonistic calculous where criminals try
to maximize pleasure and minimize pain and therefore criminals only commit a crime when the benefits outweigh
the costs. It assumes that criminals have a functioning understanding of the law they plan to violate.
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to prevent others from committing the same crime. Civil forfeiture is not designed to remedy
any specific crime, but to provide a punitive action in which others understand that committing
another such action would be devastating.
In 1996, then Attorney General, Janet Reno had also declared civil forfeiture to be a
punitive action law enforcement has the power to make. Specifically, civil forfeiture is designed
to punish and deter criminal activity (Jenson & Gerber, 1996). Again, the same language
appears. Civil forfeiture is designed to punish and deter, not remedy and alleviate.
3.4 Austin v. United States
In 1993, the Supreme Court of the United States heard the case Austin v. United States.
Austin had been convicted of selling cocaine for which he used his auto-body shop as a location
to sell the drugs. Upon conviction, law enforcement seized both the auto-body shop and his
mobile home which Austin used to house the illicit drugs. Austin appealed the forfeiture of both
his shop and home based on the Eight Amendment’s excessive fines clause. The Court had to
decide whether the Eighth Amendment applied to civil forfeiture. For the Eighth Amendment to
apply, civil forfeiture had to be deemed, at least in part, to be a punishment. Ultimately, the
Supreme Court decided with Austin, that the seizure of both his home and shop violated the
excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment (Austin v. United States, 1993).
The Court stated that civil forfeiture is considered punitive for three reasons. First, civil
forfeiture focuses on the culpability of the owner (Austin v. United States, 1993). Although the
guilt or innocence of an owner is not considered during a civil forfeiture trial, civil forfeiture is
designed to punish owners who use their property illegally (Cassella, 2013). Civil forfeiture also
punishes owners who lend their property to another party who in turn uses it illegally. This can
be exemplified by Calero-Toledo, where the owner of the yacht leased his property to a third
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party. The owner was ultimately punished for the actions of the people on the yacht when he
was deprived of his property.
Secondly, the Court concluded that civil forfeiture is punitive because it is tied directly
into a crime (Austin v. United States, 1993). For property to be seized via civil forfeiture, the
property must have a direct link to a crime. Because of this relationship, it is difficult to view
civil forfeiture as anything other than an additional criminal punishment. Simply put, if no crime
occurs, the government has no right to seize property. Therefore, civil forfeiture must be – at
least in part – a criminal sanction and punishment.
Lastly, the Court recognized Congress’ intentions with civil forfeiture. As stated earlier.
Congress enacted civil forfeiture laws as a method to deter and punish property owners who use
their property illegally.
After declaring civil forfeiture punitive, the Supreme Court built its argument as to why
the Eighth Amendment should apply to civil forfeiture. According to a previous decision,
Browning v. Ferris11, the Supreme Court had declared that the Eighth Amendment was designed
to prevent the government from abusing its power to punish. Coupled with Justice Blackmun’s
claim “the government’s conduct in a civil proceeding is limited by the Eighth
Amendment…must fail unless the challenged governmental action, despite its label, would have
been recognized as a criminal punishment…” (Austin v. United States, 1993), it is clear the Court
agreed civil forfeiture to be punitive and went as far as to declare civil forfeiture a criminal
punishment.
However, Austin failed to accomplish two important things. First, the case failed to
establish to what extent the Eighth Amendment applies to civil forfeiture. Specifically, the Court

11

(Browning-Ferris Industries v Kelco Disposal, 1989)
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did not present a proportionality test to be used when determining the excessiveness of a
forfeiture. Because the Supreme Court failed to establish an objective proportionality test, there
are currently six different federal circuits that have varying standards of the proportionality test.
In some circuits, it is enough to satisfy the proportionality test by simply establishing a nexus
between a piece of property and a crime (Johnson, 2002).
Second, the Supreme Court not only failed to apply other amendments to civil forfeiture,
such as the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, but went out of their way to argue why these
amendments do not apply to civil forfeiture. The Court appears to conflict with its own
argument. First, the Court established that the Eighth Amendment is not restricted to criminal
trials, unlike the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Because the Eighth Amendment is not strictly
limited to criminal trials, it can be applied to civil forfeiture. However, the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments are restricted to criminal trials and therefore cannot be applied to civil forfeiture.
This contradicts what the Court said earlier when it established its arguments justifying
the Eighth Amendment’s constitutional application to civil forfeiture. The Court declared the
Eighth Amendment was designed to check the government’s power to punish. Additionally, the
Court stated the Eighth Amendment applies to legal powers that have a criminal punitive
outcome, even if the label is civil. In this case, the Court recognized civil forfeiture as not only
punitive, but in part, criminal. If civil forfeiture is punitive and criminal, then the other
constitutional amendments must also apply to civil forfeiture. Yet the Court rejected this notion
because the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are purely restricted to criminal trials and civil
forfeiture is still civil law.
The Supreme Court declared the Eighth Amendment constitutionally applied to civil
forfeiture in Austin because the Eighth Amendment is designed to restrict punitive actions by the
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government and to check the government’s ability to enforce criminal sanctions. Despite this
ruling, the Court refused to claim civil forfeiture to be criminal or purely punitive and therefore
decided that they were not constitutionally obligated to apply other amendments to civil
forfeiture. Additionally, the Court failed to establish a proportionality test as to when the Eight
Amendment should restrict civil forfeiture powers.
3.5 Civil Forfeiture’s Adversarial Nature
It is difficult to fully discount the remedial aspect of civil forfeiture, specifically because
of how the funds can be used. Not all states allow for forfeiture proceeds to be placed in law
enforcement funds. Sometimes, the proceeds are placed in victim compensation funds and
recently in Utah, the proceeds are placed in an education funds. However, civil forfeiture is an
adversarial court process where property is placed on trial against the state. In such cases, just as
in criminal court, the adversarial nature of the trial suggests that civil forfeiture is punitive.
During a criminal trial, a defendant is placed in an adversarial courtroom. When a
defendant is convicted, the defendant is punished by the state through various means. The
justice system considers this action punitive because it is viewed from the perspective of the
defendant. A criminal case is not viewed from the perspective of the victim nor the state,
otherwise it could also be considered partially remedial. For example, if a burglar is sentenced to
prison, the state has remedied an injustice casted upon another citizen. However, since the
justice system cares only for the perspective of the defendant, the governmental action of
imprisonment is considered punitive.
Civil court is slightly different because the government is not always the litigator and the
Constitution is designed to restrict government power, not private power. However, in civil
forfeiture, the legal actor is always the government. Private parties are unable to seize each
other’s property. Using civil court as a stage in which to seize property is a way for the
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government to bypass traditional legal understandings of government power allowing the
government to seize property without being restricted by proper legal protections. If civil
forfeiture is viewed from the perspective of the owner – for it is the owner who is in danger of
losing property – then civil forfeiture is punitive.
In a civil forfeiture case, the adopted perspective is that of the government’s. The
purpose of civil forfeiture is to help law enforcement fight crime by possessing proceeds from
crime. From this perspective, the legal actions taken by the government are remedial in the sense
that they are designed to help fight crime. As a result, the government is able to bypass many
legal protections. In reality, civil forfeiture must be viewed from the perspective of the owner
who is being punished through the deprivation of his property. From this perspective, it is clear
that civil forfeiture is punitive.
The perspective of the owner must be taken over the perspective of the government. The
government is always the legal actor in a civil forfeiture trial. That is, the government decides
when to pursue or not pursue a forfeiture. From the beginning, the owner is at a disadvantage.
Additionally, the government is seeking to punish the owner and therefore the owner must have
proper protections in order to prevent abuses. Finally, whether the property is seized or not by
the end of the trial, the trial itself represents an intrusion of a citizen’s life by the government,
one in which the owner may be forced to pay for many legal expenses and lose out on work. The
owner is the party most harmed by civil forfeiture, whether the property is seized or not.
3.6 United States v. Halper
In United States v. Halper, the Supreme Court of the United States tried to distinguish
how perspective comes into play in a civil forfeiture trial. First, the Court recognized the
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difference between instrumental12 property and facilitating property13. For example, the Court
ruled that forfeitures are considered remedial if the “instrument of harm is itself culpable”
(United States v. Halper, 1989). This is an example of instrumental property, for the property
was itself the object which committed the crime. However, civil forfeiture cannot retain its
remedial purpose and must substitute it with punishment if the forfeiture is used to deter a crime
or if it is used for retribution of a crime (United States v. Halper, 1989).
Note the perspective in the different definitions the Court provided. Civil forfeiture is
remedial if taken from the perspective of the property. If the property is itself culpable, then the
forfeiture is remedial to pay for the expenses of the crime of which the property committed.
However, this perspective begs the question, how can an inanimate, thoughtless, un-living object
be culpable of anything? Contrarily, civil forfeiture is punitive when perceived from the
perspective of the owner. Civil forfeiture is a punishment if it used to deter. Deterrence is
inherently of the perspective of the owner for deterrence is either used to prevent a person from
committing an act or others from committing an act. Therefore, from the perspective of the
owner, civil forfeiture is always a punishment.
Interestingly, the Court also stated civil forfeiture is also punitive if it is used for
retribution of a crime. This appears to be an inherent contradiction between the purpose of civil
forfeiture and its remedial nature. Civil forfeiture is remedial because the funds and proceeds of
a crime are channeled back to fight crime or compensate for a crime. This is the same as
retribution. Asset forfeiture provides retribution for a crime by its very nature.
Astoundingly, the Court leaves the determination of perspective to the government. If
the government can show the forfeiture serves legitimate goals, then the forfeiture retains its
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Instrumental Property – Property used to commit the crime itself
Facilitating Property – Property used to house the crime but may not have taken direct action in the crime itself
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remedial shield (United States v. Halper, 1989). Instead of admitting the contradictions which
appear naturally in civil forfeiture, the Court layered another level on top of the existing
concerns. Although it is up to the government to illustrate the legitimate goals of the forfeiture,
the owner does not have a chance to illustrate the punitive nature of the seizure. The government
is the affirmative actor in determining the punitive or remedial tone of a civil forfeiture trial. The
government is also the singular party which benefits from a civil forfeiture trial.
3.7 Justice Holmes’ Constitutionality Test
Whether civil forfeiture is purely punitive or semi-punitive, there is an important
statement by Justice Holmes which he provided when he served on the Supreme Court. Justice
Oliver Holmes stated “statutes…are unconstitutional…[if] they punish the plaintiff with heavy
fines and penalties…without defining the crime…of which he is guilty and without providing
any criminal procedure or right guaranteed him by the Constitution of the United States…”
(Homes Paper Section 4 Sequence 17). Essentially, statutes are unconstitutional if (1) it punishes
the plaintiff without declaring the plaintiff guilty of a crime, (2) it does not provide proper
criminal procedure, and (3) it does not provide proper constitutional rights and protections. Civil
forfeiture does everything Holmes declared unconstitutional.
First, for the government to seize property via civil forfeiture, it is not legally obligated to
prove the owner of the seized property to be guilty of any crime. As stated before, civil
forfeiture is an in rem proceeding so the property is placed on trial, not the owner. Therefore, the
government does not have to charge the owner, let alone prove the owner guilty. Additionally,
as mentioned, in 80% of civil forfeiture trials, the owner is not charged with a crime (Worrall &
Kovandzic, 2008).
Second, civil forfeiture does not provide proper criminal procedure. In fact, civil
forfeiture does not provide any criminal procedure. Civil forfeiture occurs in civil court. The
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government can pursue a consecutive criminal trial against the owner of the property but the
outcome of that trial has no bearing on the civil forfeiture case. The guilt or innocence of the
owner does not act as a mitigating or aggravating factor in a civil forfeiture trial.
Third, civil forfeiture does not provide proper constitutional protections. The only
amendment that has had success on mitigating the power of civil forfeiture is the Eighth
Amendment, as exemplified by Austin’s precedent. Therefore, if civil forfeiture is only partly
punitive, it is unconstitutional according to the precedent established by Holmes..
Per Holmes’ constitutionality test, civil forfeiture punishes owners unconstitutionally.
Additionally, in any civil forfeiture trail, it is the government which is the legal actor. The
government is compensated for a wrong – a crime – through forfeited assets. Civil forfeiture is
not only punitive, but unconstitutional and acts as a device in which the government can seek
compensation for a crime while avoiding many legal protections afforded to defendants in a
criminal trial.
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Chapter 4: Failed Precedent and Constitutional Misreading
The punitive and remedial nature of civil forfeiture is not the only thing the courts have
had difficulty defining in civil forfeiture law. The courts have consistently provided
contradictory precedent regarding the constitutionality of civil forfeiture. This chapter will
analyze various court cases and the precedent established in order to highlight the discrepancies
inherent in contemporary civil forfeiture law.
4.1 The Sixth Amendment and Legal Representation in Civil Forfeiture
During the 1960s, there was a large push to enact protections for indigent clients in civil
forfeiture trials. Specifically, the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) readied federal funds
to be available for legal services for the poor, and federal lawyers began to win legal victories in
local and district courts in the name of a civil Gideon14 (Rulli, 2011). However, the OEO was
later dismantled by President Nixon and Lassiter prevented a civil Gideon from taking place.
Despite the Lassiter ruling, the case, coupled with Austin, provides an interesting
argument as to why there should be legal representation in civil forfeiture trials, if not a complete
civil Gideon. Austin was not the first time the Supreme Court ruled civil forfeiture to be punitive.
In 1886, the Supreme Court ruled civil forfeiture to be quasi-criminal (Boyd v. United States,
1886). Although this precedent was established long before Austin, it still holds significance.
The quasi-criminal ruling created a strange legal limbo in which civil forfeiture currently exists.
There are two possible legal courts, either criminal or civil. There is no such thing as a quasicriminal justice system. Therefore, it is difficult to discern what “quasi-criminal” means.
However, the term, quasi-criminal, suggests that the legal action is quasi-punitive. This
is only strengthened through the Austin precedent. If an owner is in danger of losing their
property in a civil forfeiture trial, and if that legal action is considered partly punitive, owners
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Civil Gideon – the push to incorporate similar legal protections of indigent clients in criminal court to civil court
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should have the right of legal counsel. Otherwise the legal action is unconstitutional. According
to the Lassiter precedent however, a person is only granted legal counsel should they be in
danger of losing physical liberty.
Physical liberty can be difficult to define. According to John Locke, liberty is
synonymous with property. In fact, John Locke argued that there are natural laws which state
people have a right to “life, liberty and property” (Locke, 1884). Property is anything that a
person mixes his labor with (Locke, 1884). A person can mix their labor with an object by
working to produce an object or spending money on the object so long as the money comes from
some form of labor. Therefore, anytime the government deprives an owner of their property, the
government is essentially removing or defying a citizen’s physical liberty. If such is true, per
Lassiter’s precedent, counsel must be appointed when someone is in danger of losing their
physical property. Locke’s interpretation of property and liberty is paramount as the Declaration
of Independence is based heavily on Locke-ian principles.
Despite Locke’s best attempt, the practicality of legal representation in civil forfeiture
presents another problem. During the 1980s under President Reagan and President Clinton there
were drastic federal funding cuts (Rulli, 2011). Due to these large funding cuts, providing legal
counsel for indigent clients, even in criminal cases, became difficult. Currently, public defenders
already face the challenges of an overburdened criminal justice system.
Years after Austin’s precedent, in 2005, some lawyers began to fight for the right of
counsel in civil forfeiture trials ( (Rulli, 2011). This push was just as successful as the push in
the 1970s. However, advocates learned a very important lesson, that the courts appeared
incompetent to reform civil forfeiture law in any meaningful way. Instead, advocates shifted
their position from the courts to the legislators and attempted to reform CAFRA. The civil
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Gideon movement finally began to see tangible progress when a clause was added to CAFRA
which guaranteed counsel for indigent clients. Although this right is not protected under the
Constitution, CAFRA is a universal civil forfeiture legislation which applies to all civil forfeiture
trials.
More specifically, CAFRA accomplishes three goals which makes indigent client
representation possible. First, it provided funding for federal courts to appoint legal counsel for
clients who are subject to civil forfeiture and a criminal proceeding at the same time in which the
client is represented by a public defender (Rulli, 2011). Although this appears to be a step
toward civil Gideon, it must be noted that this would not apply to most civil forfeiture cases. As
stated earlier, in 80% of civil forfeiture cases, the owner is never charged with a crime, much less
suffers a consecutive criminal trial (Worrall J. L., 2001).
Second, CAFRA mandated a client to have representation if the client’s primary
residence is subject to forfeiture (Rulli, 2011). Again, this is a limited protection. Any other
property does not receive the same protection. Therefore, property which is disproportional to a
crime, so long as the forfeiture is considered remedial via the instrumentality test, can still be
seized without the owner having any form of representation.
Lastly, CAFRA offers an incentive for which lawyers can take advantage to make them
more likely to litigate a civil forfeiture case. CAFRA awards attorneys with attorney fees who
can successfully argue and defend a piece of property in a civil forfeiture trial (Rulli, 2011).
This incentive is not limited by any specific piece of property or rule and offers a counter to civil
forfeiture abuse.
A recurring problem within civil forfeiture is the investment law enforcement – including
district attorneys – have in the forfeiture of property. That is that law enforcement gains
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pecuniary benefits directly from successful forfeitures. By paying lawyers who successfully
defend property in a civil forfeiture case, it provides a direct counterpoint to lawyers who benefit
from a successful forfeiture. This however is by no means a fix to the conflict of interest found
in civil forfeiture trials.
4.2 Introduction to the Innocent Owner Defense
In 1988, a new defense against civil forfeiture began to take traction known as the
innocent owner defense. However, the innocent owner defense in the late 1980s and 1990s had
many flaws. For example, there were different rules for how the innocent owner defense (IOD)
could be employed over real or personal property. There was no uniformity between the federal
district courts on how the defense should be employed (Rulli, 2011).
There are three factors that appellate courts have recognized in IODs. First, the legal
conveyance of property, second, the ignorance of the owner, and third, the owner’s actionable
culpability (Johnson, 2002). It is important to understand that not all district courts recognize
each factor, nor do all courts rank the factors equally. To better illustrate how the factors operate
in a defense, each one will be analyzed individually.
First, the legal conveyance of property. According to this factor, the innocent owner
defense can only work if the property involved in the crime was stolen or otherwise illegally
obtained. For example, if a car was stolen and used to transport illegal drugs, the owner of the
car could assert an innocent owner defense. However, if two people owned a car and one of
them used it to transport drugs, the second owner could not employ an IOD. Should the second
owner in this case be unaware of their co-owner using the car illegally, the IOD still could not be
employed because the conveyance of property was legal.
Per the owner ignorance IOD, owners must be proven ignorant of their property’s illegal
usage for the defense to work. No matter if the conveyance of property was legal or illegal, the
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owner must be unknowing of the illegal usage. If a person’s car was stolen to transport drugs,
the owner could use the ignorant owner defense. If two people co-owned a car and one used it to
transport drugs, if the second owner was ignorant the IOD could be employed. In fact, the
ignorant owner defense appears, at face value, to be a fair defense.
Lastly, the actionable culpability of the owner is the final factor. There is a distinction
between actionable culpability and owner culpability. If an owner is aware their property could
be used illegally, the owner must do everything reasonable to prevent the illegal usage of their
property. To demonstrate, if a person’s car was stolen, the owner of the car is mandated to alert
the authorities. If the owner fails to do so and the car is used for illegal means, then the owner
would be incapable of employing the IOD. Of course, in the example given, the owner would
first have to be aware their car was stolen before they could be reasonably held accountable.
Again, not every court uses all three of these factors and not every court measures each
factor equally. Additionally, the IOD is not constitutionally protected (Johnson, 2002). Because
the IOD is not constitutionally protected, the Supreme Court of the United States is in no way
obligated to stabilize the various ways in which civil forfeiture IODs can be used.
4.3 The Failure of Austin and Whaler’s Cove Dr.
An IOD is not the only reform civil forfeiture needs. Per Austin’s precedent, civil
forfeiture is subject to the Eighth Amendment. However, Austin’s precedent has largely been a
failure for three reasons: (1) courts have rarely declared forfeitures as excessive, (2) there is little
precedent regarding civil forfeiture and the excessive fines clause, and (3) the Supreme Court
failed to create a universal test (Johnson, 2002). Before Austin, there was no precedent to
regarding how the Eighth Amendment could apply to civil forfeiture. Thus, courts do not have
precedent to fall back on when considering if a forfeiture violates the Eighth Amendment.
Additionally, courts have been hesitant to declare forfeitures excessive, attributing to the scarce
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amount of precedent regarding the subject. Without a universal test, there is no unifying
precedent to establish what is constitutional during a forfeiture.
In 1992, it appeared the stars had finally aligned in an effort not only to prove civil
forfeiture punitive, but that its punitive nature was unconstitutional. The Second Federal Court
of Appeals had to decide in United States v. Whalers Cove Drive15 whether a piece of real
property worth $145,000 seized based on a $250 drug sale was constitutional. The owner of the
property, Levin, made two arguments of note: (1) the double jeopardy clauses prohibited the
forfeiture and, (2) the Eighth Amendment was violated by the forfeiture.
The Court had to deliberate whether the forfeiture was punitive before it could address
the constitutional challenges presented in this case. Before the Court decided if the action was
punitive, the Court made an interesting claim regarding the punitive nature of civil forfeiture
“The classification of a sanction as punitive under Halper does not automatically transform the
sanction proceeding into a criminal prosecution…Nonetheless, certain constitutional protections
do attach to a ‘civil’ sanction that in effect is punishment.” (United States v. Whalers Cove
Drive, 1992). Essentially, if an action is considered punitive, it does not make the action a
criminal sanction. However, should the action be civil and punitive at the same time, the
constitution does still apply. Levin did not have to prove civil forfeiture is criminal, but punitive
for the amendments to apply to not only his case but civil forfeiture in general.
Based on past precedent, such as Halper, the Second Federal Court declared the
forfeiture to be punitive (United States v. Whalers Cove Drive, 1992). Their justification is
largely based on the disproportionate forfeiture for a relatively small drug trade. However, the
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Court seems to do what every court does when deliberating on a civil forfeiture case and double
back on previous precedent, twist it and bend it until it can justify the forfeiture.
Although the action was punitive, the Second Federal Court denied that the Fifth and
Eighth Amendment applied to the case. Specifically, double jeopardy prohibits the government
from punishing the same party twice for one offense. However, the federal circuit court stated
the double jeopardy clause only applies when the same government agency is trying to punish a
certain party. Should two different government agencies wish to punish the same person for a
single offence, the punitive action does not violate double jeopardy (United States v Whalers
Cove Drive, 1992). Civil forfeiture’s distinction as civil grants immunity from the double
jeopardy clause under this understanding. The criminal and civil law of the justice system
constitutes different government agencies in this definition. Essentially, civil forfeiture by nature
provides and egregious excuse to bypass the double jeopardy clause.
Additionally, the Eighth Amendment does not apply to civil forfeiture in this case. There
are three steps to determine whether a punishment or fine constitutes excessiveness. First, the
gravity of the offense, (2) the gravity of the crime within the jurisdiction it was committed and,
(3) the gravity of the offense within other jurisdictions (Solem v Helm, 1983). Essentially, a
punishment is not excessive if the punishment measures to the gravity of the offense from an
individual perspective, jurisdictional perspective and national perspective. In the case of Levin,
the forfeiture of the real property is not excessive because of the Supreme Court’s recognition of
the impact of illegal drug activity in the aggregate (United States v. Whalers Cove Drive, 1992).
Instead of looking at the forfeiture individually, the Court compared the forfeiture of the
property to all drug offenses. This is not a fair level of analysis to use for this case. To place
blame on Levin for all drug offenses is not only unfair but inaccurate. Additionally, other crimes
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are not held to the same standards. When a murderer is sentenced, the killer is not punished for
all murders otherwise, in every state that has the death penalty, all murderers would be sentenced
to death.
4.4 Instrumentality Test
To alleviate the problems presented by the Austin precedent and conflicting Whalers
Cove precedent, some circuit courts began to develop an instrumentality test to determine if a
forfeiture violated the Eighth Amendment. The Second Federal Court of Appeals spearheaded
the movement in United States v. Chandler16. The government had seized thirty-three acres of
land from Chandler after drugs were found growing in his farm. Chandler appealed the
forfeiture under the proposition that it was excessive.
The instrumentality test is as follows, first there must be a clear nexus between the
property and the crime. The role and culpability of the owner is also taken into consideration. If
the owner is wholly unaware of her property having been used illegally, the owner stands a better
chance of repealing the forfeiture based on the instrumentality offense. Lastly, the Court
considered the ability for the guilty property to be separated from the innocent. To illustrate, if a
drug dealer places money from his deals into a bank account that he uses also to save money
gained from legitimate means – such as a credible job – it would be difficult for the government
to separate the illegal money from the legal money. Therefore, in the example given, it could be
excessive to seize the entire bank account if not all the money was gained through illicit means.
In addition to establishing a instrumentality test, the Court provided instructions on how
to determine the strength of the nexus between the crime and the property. If the property was
deliberately used for the sake of the crime and was used over a long period of time for criminal
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intentions and its original purpose was criminal, the nexus between the property and the crime
would be strong. Essentially, the purpose of the instrumentality test is to decide if the property
was a necessary for the crime to occur and if so, if the owner was culpable and if the property
can be easily distinguished between illegal and legal property.
If the government can adequately prove that property was an instrumentality of a crime,
through the nexus test listed above, the government is hence able to retain the remedial aspect of
civil forfeiture. The understanding is that if a piece of property was an instrumentality of a
crime, by removing the instrument which committed the crime, the government is thereby
making the community safe by prohibiting further crimes to be committed by the said property
(United States v. Shakeel Ahmad, 2000).
The problem with the instrumentality test is should a piece of property be deemed an
instrumentality, the in rem action retains its remedial protections against the constitution and the
Eighth Amendment, along with others, no longer applies to the forfeiture. In Austin, civil
forfeiture was declared subject to the Eighth Amendment if it is considered punitive. In cases
where civil forfeiture is declared an instrumentality, and is therefore remedial, any property
which the government can prove with probable cause to be a part of the crime is then subject to
forfeiture. According to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, if a piece of property is considered
an instrumentality, its proportionality to the committed crime no longer matters.
4.5 The Instrumentality Test in Practice
To elaborate, in United States v. Shakeel Ahmad, the Fourth Circuit Court deliberated on
whether a fraud case involving $186,587.42 allowed for the seizure of the entirety of the
involved money. The Court declared that the money involved in the fraudulent action was itself
an instrumentality of the offense. Following this declaration, the Court had to decide if the
forfeiture of the money would be grossly disproportionate to the crime committed.
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In a previous Supreme Court case, the Supreme Court of the United States declared that
forfeitures – whether in rem or in personam – violate the Eighth Amendment excessive fines
clause if the forfeiture is “grossly disproportional” to the crime committed (United States v.
Bajakajian, 1998). To determine if the assets seized are grossly disproportional, the Court
weighted the effects of the crime verse the seized assets.
Per Ahmad, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals did measure the assets against the result
of the criminal action. Specifically, Ahmad committed fraud by transferring more than $10,000
dollars to Pakistan in return for medical equipment. However, Ahmad was doing so in packets
less than $10,000 at a time, therefore bypassing custom service requirements of reporting
transactions of more than $10,000. The result of such a criminal action does not cost the
government any money. The Fourth Circuit Court acknowledged that the only consequence of
this crime is the government is not being notified of the transaction (United States v. Shakeel
Ahmad, 2000).
To seize nearly $190,000 in retaliation for not being notified of a transaction appears
disproportional to the crime committed. However, the Fourth Circuit Court understood
Bajakajian’s precedent to be limited to punitive forfeitures. As in Ahmad, the forfeiture was
declared remedial because the money was an instrumentality of the crime. Therefore, in any
case in which civil forfeiture is declared remedial, the forfeiture is not subject to the protections
of the Eighth Amendment.
The significance of the instrumentality test is paramount when deliberating the cause of a
civil forfeiture case. However, the Supreme Court has yet to deliberate either affirming or
denying the test. The circuit courts have thus been on their own when deciphering the precedent
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of Austin. Lacking universal precedent, civil forfeiture has only become more complicated,
making it difficult for owners to follow civil forfeiture law.
For example, in Ahmad, there are two contradictions that appear within case law and
previous civil forfeiture precedent. The government originally attempted to seize the assets in
Ahmad in a criminal forfeiture case. To seize the property, the government had to prove Ahmad
was willingly and knowingly defrauding the United States. After the government failed to do so,
it attempted to seize the property via civil forfeiture which had no such requirement.
Following the switch to civil forfeiture, the government did not have to prove Ahmad
willingly defrauded the United States. The term “willingly” is very important. It implies that
Ahmad first had to knowingly understand United States fraud laws and then decided to violate
those laws. “Willingly” can therefore be subsided with “culpability”. If so, the Court
acknowledged that the owner does not have to be proven to be culpable of their property in a
civil forfeiture case. This directly conflicts with precedent established in Austin, Chandler and
Whalers Cove where the courts decided an owner must be culpable of their property to have their
property seized.
Additionally, in Ahmad, when the government decided to seize property under civil
forfeiture, it was required to prove by probable cause that the property was involved in the
offense per civil forfeiture law. To do so, the government relied on Ahmad’s criminal conviction
which took place prior to the civil forfeiture proceeding to show probable cause that the assets
were involved in a crime. This appears to contradict civil forfeiture law. The guilt or innocence
of an owner does not act as a mitigating or aggravating factor in a civil forfeiture case. Because
of this, the government can seize property belonging to an owner who has not been convicted of

CIVIL FORFEITURE: THE FAILURE OF THE COURTS 52
a crime. By using Ahmad’s conviction, the Court is ignoring this civil forfeiture precedent,
created a contradiction in which the government greatly benefits.
Although Austin’s precedent appeared to be a progressive step in civil forfeiture law, the
fallout from the case has caused conflict and division among lower courts. Civil forfeiture is in
desperate need of unifying and decisive precedent which needs to come from the Supreme Court
of the United States. Without such precedent, civil forfeiture law will continue to be full of
contradictions. It cannot be expected for the people to follow civil forfeiture law and prevent the
illegal use of their property under any definition if there is no singular definition for which they
are to be held to. The goals of civil forfeiture will continue to be undermined until these
contradictions are addressed.
4.6 United States v. Good and the Fifth Amendment
In 1993, another monumental case regarding civil forfeiture was decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States. United States v. Good (1993)17, the Supreme Court declared when
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to civil forfeiture cases. Prior to the case,
Good had been convicted of possession of illegal drugs. Specifically, Good had grown eightynine pounds of marijuana on his multi-acre farm. Five years following the conviction, the
government placed a warrant on the land and seized Good’s property but, the government did not
provide any prior notice to Good (United States v. Good, 1993).
Good appealed the forfeiture of his property claiming without prior notice, the
government violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Also, Good stated the fiveyears following the conviction was too long of a time for the government to seize his property in
relation to the drug violation. The government countered by declaring that drug forfeitures allow
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law enforcement exceptions to time distillations when it comes to forfeiting property (United
States v Good, 1993). The Supreme Court sided against both of the government’s arguments.
The Supreme Court was not comfortable with relinquishing Good’s home to the
government easily. Although the Court stated that forfeitures were subjected to the Fourth
Amendment, Good did not appeal based on the Fourth Amendment, but rather under the Fifth
Amendment. Additionally, no amendment has dominion over the other, so long as the legal
action defies one of the amendments, it is unconstitutional. Finally, the Court declared the right
to prior notice of a forfeiture of real property is paramount to satisfying the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment (United States v. Good, 1993). Hence, since the government failed to
provide prior notice, the seizure violated the due process of the Fifth Amendment and was
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court finally declared when due process applies to civil forfeiture cases,
but the victory was minor at best. In order to prevent conflict with existing precedent, the
Supreme Court limited its ruling to real property, and more specifically to property which the
owner uses for a home (United States v. Good, 1993). Under this ruling, the government is not
required to provide notice for any personal property and may even be able to seize certain real
property if it is able to provide a strong enough legal argument.
Nevertheless, the victory of Good should not be understated. The Supreme Court did not
bother with the punitive or remedial argument regarding civil forfeiture in Good. This could be
an example of the Supreme Court unofficially recognizing the punitive nature of forfeiture. In
previous cases, the Supreme Court found the punitive aspect of civil forfeiture to be awkward
and a subject which it did not want to approach. By denying the argument any space in the case,
the Court may be trying to avoid the conversation to prevent any contradictions with previous
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precedent. Also, by providing a definition for when the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause
should be enforced against forfeiture, the Supreme Court may have recognized the punitive
nature of civil forfeiture without declaring civil forfeiture punitive. Essentially, Good provides a
foothold for further precedent to establish the punitive aspects of civil forfeiture.
4.7 Bennis v. Michigan
The final case analysis is Bennis v. Michigan (1996). This case illustrates the most
perplexing aspect of civil forfeiture which is the application of the innocent owner defense.
During this case, the petitioner’s husband engaged in sexual activity with prostitutes inside of a
car that was co-owned by the petitioner and her husband (Bennis v. Michigan, 1996). Per
Michigan state law, the car was seized for being used for prostitution. Bennis, the petitioner,
appealed the forfeiture of her car under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
that she was unaware of her husband’s intentions.
The Supreme Court of the United States had the final word in this case and ruled against
Bennis. To justify this decision, the Supreme Court relied on precedent from many of the cases
mentioned earlier. First, the Supreme Court addressed the due process violation allegation.
Unlike many of the cases mentioned, Bennis claimed that due process was violated based on the
Fourteenth Amendment instead of the Fifth Amendment. The purpose of claiming the
Fourteenth Amendment is to break free from precedent established under the Fifth Amendment.
Per Good, due process under the Fifth Amendment is not violated so long as the owner is
provided with prior notice and a chance to appeal the forfeiture.
In Bennis, the petitioner was afforded both prior notice and opportunity to appeal the
forfeiture, however, Bennis’ attempt to employ the Fourteenth Amendment would theoretically
bypass Fifth Amendment precedent. Despite her legal cunning, unfortunately for Bennis, about
seventy years prior to her case, another petitioner under similar circumstances attempted the
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same appeal. In Van Oster v. Kansas (1926), petitioner Van Oster appealed the forfeiture of her
car claiming it violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme
Court of the United States declared that civil forfeiture under similar circumstances had never
violated due process under the Fifth Amendment and therefore could not possibly violate due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment (Van Oster v. Kansas, 1926). Per Van Oster’s
precedent, the Supreme Court was able to dismiss Bennis’ Fourteenth Amendment claim.
Contrary to what the Supreme Court suggests in their ruling, the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment provide due process in slightly different ways and have been understood to be
different. The Fifth Amendment’s due process is limited to trial procedures. For example, the
protections against self-incrimination is protected under due process of the Fifth Amendment
because this protection is pertinent to a trial. However, the Fourteenth Amendment provides
protections against unreasonable government intrusions on a person’s life. Just as officers
forcing their way into a house without a search warrant or exigent circumstances would violate
the Fourth Amendment, it would also violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause as
an unreasonable intrusion.
In Van Oster, the Court’s decision declaring civil forfeiture not in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment due to Fifth Amendment precedent is disingenuous to the fine distinction
between the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment. To declare civil forfeiture constitutional per the
Fifth Amendment’s due process clause is not the same as to declare it constitutional per the
Fourteenth Amendment. Under the Fifth Amendment, civil forfeiture simply follows trial due
process, that the subject of the trial – in this case an inanimate object – is granted proper and
reasonable rights, protections, and procedures. However, the Fourteenth Amendment provides
protections against unreasonable government intrusions into a person’s life. For the government
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to seize property belonging to an innocent owner, such as in Bennis, appears to be an obvious
example of an unreasonable government intrusion of private life.
Bennis’ claim to ignorance as to her husband’s intentions provided a slightly harder
argument for the Court to bypass. To do so, the Court relied on precedent which traced back
from The Palmyra v. United States (1866) to Austin v. United States (1993). Over and over, the
Supreme Court recognized that the innocent owner defense based on ignorance was not
constitutionally protected. Although some federal circuit courts have declared ignorance to be
enough to satisfy the innocent owner defense, the Supreme Court has never claimed that the
constitution requires this definition (Bennis v. Michigan, 1996).
The alarming aspect of Bennis comes from this part of the decision. Although the
innocent/ignorant owner defense is not protected under the Constitution, neither is the opposite.
The Constitution does not declare that the innocent owner defense is not to be applied nor that
ignorance of a crime shall not allow for a reversal of a forfeiture. Instead of deciding if the
innocent/ignorant owner defense defies the Constitution, the Supreme Court has routinely
declared the defense to not be present in the Constitution.
This very line of thinking appears to, if not violate, contradict the Bill of Rights. The
Tenth Amendment declares that the rights listed within the Constitution are not encompassing.
Rather, there are rights not listed within the Constitution which are still enjoyed by citizens.
Following this amendment, the innocent/ignorant owner defense could easily fit within the
Constitution. The Court should be barred from analyzing the innocent owner defense under the
perspective of an encompassing Constitution and must be compelled by the Tenth Amendment to
determine if the innocent owner defense directly violates the Constitution. Fundamentally, the
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Supreme Court has failed to properly analyze the constitutionality of civil forfeiture and thus
created all the internal legal contradictions of the practice.
The Supreme Court’s reading of the IOD prohibits defendants from employing the
innocent owner defense at the Supreme Court level. For as long as the government is constantly
willing to appeal a case, any defendant appealing the forfeiture of their property is doomed to
failure, despite lower court rulings on the IOD. However, the Court’s dismissal of the IOD is
derived from a false reading of the Constitution and the Tenth Amendment.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
Civil forfeiture is a legal practice which allows the government to seize property involved
in criminal activity. Its ostensible purpose is to deprive criminals of profiting from illegal
activity. Additionally, civil forfeiture is a powerful tool to protect the economic interests of the
government. Any money that is involved in illegal activity and may otherwise be out of touch
from the public or the government is turned against criminals as it is funneled into law
enforcement agencies to fight crime.
5.1 Brief History of Civil Forfeiture
However, since its inception, civil forfeiture has been twisted by legislators, law
enforcement and, the judiciary to become an egregious internal legal contradiction which
deprives owners of their property unconstitutionally. Civil forfeiture in the United States was
founded on archaic superstition derived from English Common Law which declared property
was to be forfeited to the Crown because it was possessed by Satan (Finklestein, 1973). One of
the first cases of civil forfeiture in the United States, The Palmyra v. United States (1866),
dismissed the old English superstition but did rely on its basic principle. Specifically, the Court
declared that if a piece of property had the ability to move, it had the ability to commit a crime
and therefore could be seized by the government (The Palmyra v. United States, 1866).
Under The Palmyra precedent, civil forfeiture was limited to personal property but, this
restriction would soon expand to real property under Dobbin’s Distillery v. United States (1877).
In this case, the Supreme Court allowed for the forfeiture of a distillery because the bookkeeper
was involved in fraud (Dobbin’s Distillery v. United States, 1877). Interestingly, the legislature
would not officially endorse the forfeiture of real property until 1970 under the Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act.
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Civil forfeiture hit its first legal obstacle in Boyd v. United States, (1886). In this case,
the Supreme Court of the United States declared civil forfeiture to be “quasi-criminal” and since
this case the Supreme Court has been arguing in complex and contradictory circles to justify
itself and the legal practice at large. Some of civil forfeiture’s largest legal grievances stem from
this decision. Most notably, civil forfeiture’s internal conflict of punishment or remedy stems
from Boyd. Just as the Supreme Court was too timid then to declare civil forfeiture as punitive
or unfit to be a part of the justice system, the Court has since entrenched itself in precedent
which the Court has shown themselves too weak or otherwise unwilling to break.
During Prohibition, civil forfeiture slowly began to grow. Due to its procedural nature,
civil forfeiture is uniquely qualified to handle white collar crimes as well as drug crimes. As
Prohibition rendered in a new illegal drug, civil forfeiture became a tool for prohibition officers
to enforce newly made drug laws. Following the end of Prohibition, civil forfeiture was widely
unused by the government.
It was not until the 1970s when the government started employing asset forfeiture. It
attempted to stem the growth of organized crime through criminal forfeiture but this attempt was
largely unsuccessful due to the higher standard of procedure inherent in criminal forfeiture. To
combat the ineffectiveness of criminal forfeiture, law enforcement began to employ civil
forfeiture more often. Around the same time, there was a large movement to enact a civil
Gideon precedent which would guarantee a right to legal counsel in civil cases – including civil
forfeiture cases – for indigent clients. However, this movement was deflated after Lassiter.
During the 1980s, President Reagan declared the War on Drugs and passed the
Comprehensive Criminal Control Act of 1984 (CCCA). With its passing, the CCCA created
many new drug laws and dramatically increased civil forfeiture powers. Essentially, the CCCA
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made illegal drug violations a felony and attached civil forfeiture powers to each infraction. As
law enforcement began to employ civil forfeiture more often, some police departments became
reliant on civil forfeiture funds to supplement budgetary shortfalls.
5.2 Civil Forfeiture’s Legal Contradictions
As more civil forfeiture cases arose, the courts were left to decipher precedent which
dated back to the 1800s and discern if this long-standing practice was constitutional. Civil
forfeiture appears to violate the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizures,
the Fifth Amendment’s protections of due process and protection against double jeopardy, the
Sixth Amendment’s right of counsel and the Eighth Amendment’s protection against excessive
fines. However, these constitutionality arguments hinder on a separate argument which is
whether civil forfeiture is punitive or remedial.
The Supreme Court of the United States, along with the federal circuit courts, have not
been able to provide a clear definition of whether civil forfeiture is punitive or remedial. In
Austin v. United States, the Supreme Court declared civil forfeiture to be in part punitive and
therefore the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment does apply to forfeitures. The
Court failed to determine when forfeiture is excessive and failed to provide a proper legal test as
to what constitutes an excessive forfeiture. As a result, many federal circuit courts were forced
to discern this ruling on their own.
Federal circuit courts proved to be an inadequate venue for determining if civil forfeiture
is punitive. Additionally, the federal courts provided conflicting tests when deciding if civil
forfeiture is excessive. The instrumentality test only required for the property involved in the
crime to be instrumental in the criminal action. If a car was used to transport illegal drugs, the
car was directly involved in the criminal act and could therefore be seized despite the
proportionality of the car to the offense. Additionally, a car purchased with drug money would
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be harder to seize via the instrumentality test because that car would not have been part of the
original crime.
The second test provided by the circuit courts was the proportionality test which stated
that despite the property’s use during the crime, the key factor to be analyzed is the proportion of
the property seized to the crime committed. Austin is a clear example of how the proportionality
test might be used. Austin had sold drugs in his workplace and housed the drugs in his home.
Law enforcement seized both his business and home which was deemed to be excessive for a
relatively small drug violation. The proportion between the money of the drugs sold compared
to the cost of the business and home was too disproportionate.
As the courts put forth more complicated tests to determine the punitive and remedial
nature of civil forfeiture, the courts began to contradict themselves. Where civil forfeiture was
punitive enough as to warrant the Eighth Amendment, it was not so punitive to prevent
protections of due process or double jeopardy, or the other amendments listed.
Finally, the innocent owner defense presented one of the largest complications in civil
forfeiture precedent. If civil forfeiture is punitive, or in part punitive, there must be some rights
and protections granted to owners. However, the innocents of property owners have never acted
as mitigating or aggravating factors in civil forfeiture trials. Owners such as Van Oster and
Bennis have tried to put an innocent owner defense in practice to provide protections for
innocent owners. Enacting a proper innocent owner defense is paramount for civil forfeiture
proceedings because of the lower standard of proof required to seize property in a civil forfeiture
trial.
The Supreme Court of the United States has never upheld the innocent owner defense
despite other circuit or district court rulings. Instead, the Supreme Court has ruled that the
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innocent owner defense is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution and therefore is not
constitutionally backed. However, this reading of the innocent owner defense is the wrong
perspective for the Supreme Court to take per the Tenth Amendment. Civil forfeiture is a large
self-contradiction. Precedent circulating the legal practice is perplexing and overly complex.
The courts – specifically the Supreme Court of the United States – has tried to step over itself in
its legal arguments to uphold the constitutionality of civil forfeiture. It is clear so long as the
Supreme Court upholds civil forfeiture’s “quasi-criminal” nature, civil forfeiture will remain
unconstitutional. Instead, civil forfeiture must be deemed punitive and obtain the proper
constitutional defenses including the innocent owner defense to belong in the justice system.
5.3 Why This Matters
Civil forfeiture is not an abstract legal power which provides a stage for academic
conversation. It is a real practice which has harmed real people. In the 1960s, law enforcement
used civil forfeiture to seize the home of a sixty-year-old man with cancer and his wife (Stillman,
2013). Fortunately, the house was returned to the couple, but the government intrusion of that
extent is shameful. Civil forfeiture incentivizes officers to profit from crime. In the 1980s,
Massachusetts law enforcement nearly seized an eighty-million-dollar cruise ship because a
gram of marijuana was found on the ship (Levy, 1996).
Civil forfeiture is a legal power which preys on the disadvantaged. Indigent clients can
be, and have been, targeted to have their property seized to put money into law enforcement
coffers, exemplified by the Texas State Trooper mentioned earlier. Civil forfeiture does not
permit all indigent clients to have proper representation. Often the cost of litigation can exceed
ten-thousand-dollars (Stillman, 2013), forcing owners to give up their property if it is of less
worth than the cost to litigate.
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To see the corruption of civil forfeiture, one must only look at the precedent provided by
the courts. It is clear civil forfeiture does not fit within the Constitution. The amendments listed
in this paper show a disconnect between the legal spirit of the Constitution and its practical
application. From punishing owners who could not be criminally convicted through the
deprivation of their property, to punishing owners twice for the same crime in two separate trials,
to punishing owners innocent of crimes, civil forfeiture defies the foundation of the Constitution
and its design to limit corrupt application of power by the government.
Not only is civil forfeiture clearly unconstitutional, civil forfeiture removes property from
owners who are unable to defend themselves. It violates the very soul of the United States. The
founders threw tea in the ocean when the taxes were too high, yet now the government is
blatantly taking property away from citizens and directly profiting. Civil forfeiture must be
repealed.
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